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INTRODUCTION
It is likely that this man had some reason for withdrawing such a large amount of money, but how rational are the rest of us? Few studies have been done on actual balances of currency. Porter and Judson (1996) , citing a Federal Reserve survey of 500 households in 1995, report that the average U.S. adult held $100 in cash ($136 in 2007 dollars) .
A problem in N. Gregory Mankiw's intermediate macroeconomics text points out that a Baumol-Tobin model of money demand suggests that this amount is much too small (Mankiw 2003, p. 449; Baumol 1952; Tobin 1956 ). Using the May 1995 one-month CD rate of 5.98 percent, a measure of per capita nondurable consumption likely to be paid for with cash, the wage for private-sector production workers, a time cost for a trip to the bank of ten minutes, and an ATM fee of one dollar, the model gives a cash demand of $551.05 1 (See Appendix 2 for details about the data used in these calculations). And this model does not take into account the possible need for precautionary balances. What accounts for this discrepancy?
Another problem in Mankiw's text looks at the possibility that the chance of loss or theft might decrease desired balances. A simple way of doing so would be to use the objective function
where P is the probability that the agent's cash will be lost or stolen. Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (CVS), conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997), indicate that the incidence of completed robbery in 1995 was 3.5 per thousand persons age 12 or over. 2 The incidence of personal theft (meaning pick-pocketing or purse-snatching) was 1.9 per thousand. Adding these two figures gives P = .0035 + .0019 = .0054. Using this figure in the equation above gives a money demand of $527.73, still far above the Federal Reserve survey result. To take into account losses unrelated to crime, a larger P might be appropriate. Increasing P to .01 lowers the amount to $510.05-a figure that still strikes most people as far too high.
But it is not clear that P itself is independent of the amount of money a person holds. A common phrase on crime-prevention and tourist-advice websites is "Don't flash 1 This figure is very high relative to weekly earnings. It may be doubtful that a worker without direct deposit would, on average, carry an amount of cash larger than his or her paycheck, since depositing the check in person requires a trip to the bank. Also, many people live "paycheck to paycheck." For example, a full-time worker receiving the average wage used in this model for 1995 would have a gross biweekly paycheck of $926.40. If he or she always spends this entire amount, net of deductions, before the next check arrives, average cash balances could not be as described by this model. (The median and average U.S. residents have significant real wealth, however.) 2 Robbery is a type of theft in which the robber directly confronts the victim and uses, or threatens to use, force, with or without a weapon. Pick-pocketing and purse-snatching do not involve the use of force, but in these crimes, the thief also steals items directly from a person, rather than from an unoccupied house, office, car, etc. See footnotes to Table 2 for sources. your cash!" meaning, "Don't openly handle large amounts of money!" Perhaps people carry less cash than theory predicts because potential thieves would be more likely to commit a crime if larger amounts of cash were at stake. Some empirical evidence for this idea exists (Porter and Judson 1996, p. 902; Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998, p. 278; but see Jankowski, Porter, and Rice 2007) .
This paper pursues a twofold explanation of low household demand for cash based on this idea. First, the probability of being robbed or being the victim of a pursesnatcher or pick-pocket depends on the amount of money one holds-an endogenous probability of crime. Second, the costs of being robbed include not only the loss of the stolen money, but also what I will call "noncash" or nonpecuniary costs: psychological trauma, physical injury, lost time at work, medical bills, etc. I find that this model can go a long way toward explaining why individuals hold so much less money than theory would suggest.
The paper has five sections. Section 2 sketches some background facts about money holdings, theft, and robbery and reviews certain literature. Section 3 presents a dynamic money-in-the-utility-function model with nonpecuniary costs of robbery, some of which are incurred immediately and some of which decay over time. In this model, the probability of robbery is a function of the amount of money held. The first-order conditions for the solution of the model admit an easy interpretation involving various costs and benefits of holding cash. Section 4 augments the Baumol-Tobin model above with one-period nonpecuniary costs of robbery and endogenous probabilities of robbery, purse-snatching, and pick-pocketing. The latter model is used to arrive at quantitative solutions for money demand that better match the data mentioned above. Section 5 is a conclusion and discusses several implications of the results.
SOME BACKGROUND FACTS AND LITERATURE ON CASH HOLDINGS, ROBBERY, AND PERSONAL THEFT
As noted in the previous section, data on household cash (currency and coin) holdings are but a great deal of empirical evidence has been adduced that much, or perhaps most, of this amount is held overseas or in the underground economy (Porter and Judson 1996; Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998; Sprenkle 1993 ). For Icelandic currency, which is probably less commonly used than the dollar in foreign countries, the total stock divided by the population was the equivalent of $281 in 1996 (Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998, p. 275 ). Lippi and Secchi (2004) , using household survey data, estimate that the As noted in the introduction, there is some scattered cross-country evidence of a negative effect of violent crime on household cash holdings (Porter and Judson 1996, p. 902; Rogoff, Giavazzi, and Schneider 1998, p. 278 For robbery, the median property loss was $120 and the average was $791. The median loss for purse-snatching was $110 and for pick-pocketing the median loss was $62. The median losses for men and women and for whites and blacks were similar. The main property lost in robberies was cash or a purse, wallet, or credit cards in 55.3 percent of cases. The corresponding figure for pick-pocketing and purse-snatching was 87.8 percent. When a person's pocket was picked or purse stolen, the lost property was fully recovered only 6.7 percent of the time, while property was fully recovered after 14.7 percent of robberies. After a robbery or attempted robbery, 10.2 percent of victims missed time from work. Victims sustained injuries in 33.2 percent of all robberies. The percentage of male victims injured was slightly higher than the percentage of female victims injured. After 11.3 percent of robberies, victims incurred medical expenses.
Of course, many additional data sources are available. A Swedish study found that robbery was a strong predictor of post-traumatic stress syndrome (Frans, Rimmö, Åberg, and Frederikson 2005) . The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) found larger incidence rates for robbery (12 per thousand people aged 16 or above) and pickpocketing (8 per thousand) in their 2000 study, the last one for which published data are available (Van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2000) (see Table 1 ). Like the national survey, it revealed higher rates for both crimes in 1995 than more recently (see Table 2 ).
A DYNAMIC MONETARY MODEL WITH NONCASH COSTS AND AN ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY OF ROBBERY
In one standard type of intertemporal monetary model, the demand for money is generated by assuming that higher real balances allow the consumer to spend less time traveling to the bank, increasing time available for work or leisure. I will use an equivalent formulation in the tradition of Sidrauski (1967) , in which the consumer directly receives utility from real balances. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to measure the costs of being robbed. These can include the psychological impact, the effects of any injuries during the robbery, and so on. Moreover, these effects carry over into future periods by contributing to a state variable that might be called "the stock of trauma." The model contains only two financial assets, bonds and currency, but could easily be extended to include others, including checking accounts.
The utility function of the representative consumer is
where 0<β<1 is the discount factor; M t is nominal holdings in period t of currency; C t is the amount of the consumption good consumed; P t is the period t price level of that good; 0 < P(M t /P t-1 ) < 1 is the probability of being robbed, conditional on the amount of real balances, M t /P t-1 ; and R t is the amount of "trauma" from past robberies. This model does not include forms of theft other than robbery, which probably cause less trauma and injury. I will assume that real balances are bounded above. The functions u, w, and g are twice continuously differentiable, with
The function u is strictly concave and bounded above and is a standard utility function of the type used in Sidrauski models; w is the nonpecuniary disutility of being robbed, which is assumed to depend on the amount of cash lost; and g is the impact of past robberies on utility, due to trauma, injury, and so on. The functions u, w, and g are specified so that the expression in (1) is always nonnegative.
The constraint and law of motion for the problem depend upon whether the consumer is robbed of his or her cash balances. When the consumer is robbed of his or her cash, his or her financial constraint is
where A t is financial assets in period t, r is the real interest rate, B t is the number of bonds (with assets and bonds denominated in units of the consumption good), and y is the consumer's endowment, which is the same in each period. The consumer receives interest on the amount of the previous period that he or she invested in bonds (i.e., did not consume or change into cash).
Since I will not be focusing on intertemporal consumption decisions, I will assume for simplicity that
When the consumer is not robbed and thus retains his or her cash balances from the previous period, which nonetheless may be eroded by inflation
Assets are allowed to become negative, but must remain greater than or equal to some lower bound B, meaning that the consumer can borrow by "issuing bonds," but has a credit limit.
The law of motion of the stock of trauma from robbery is I will use the exogenous shock variable Z t to indicate whether the consumer was robbed in period t, which will take on the value 1 if a robbery has taken place and zero if not. The set
is the history of this exogenous state variable, which takes on the value 1 with the probability P each period. The consumer's problem is to maximize (1), subject to (2), (3), (4), and (5).
Specifically, the consumer's problem is to choose a plan
where Π t is a vector-valued function mapping the state variables onto the real plane
Of course, I will restrict my attention to plans that are feasible, meaning that they obey the constraints (2) and (3), given the history of victimizations Z t .
The Bellman equation for the problem is
and the supremum is over sequences that obey a no-Ponzi condition, the credit limit, nonnegativity constraints on M t and C t , and the upper bound on M t /P t-1 . By Blackwell's sufficient conditions (Stokey and Lucas 1989, p. 54) , the right hand side of equation (6) is a contraction in the space of bounded, nonnegative, continuous functions V on pairs of nonnegative numbers with the sup norm. Hence it has a solution V in that space.
Moreover, V is strictly concave and continuously differentiable. The supreme value function satisfies (6) (see Appendix 1 for details).
The Bellman equation (6) is sufficient to ensure that V is equal to the supreme value function, and all plans generated П t *(Z t-1 ) by the Bellman function as follows
achieve the supremum (see appendix for details).
Because of the continuity of the expression inside the brackets and the compactness of the action space, we can be sure that there is such a plan. By strict concavity, that plan is unique.
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior maximum for the problem on the right-hand side of (6) are 
where numerical subscripts on functions indicate partial differentiation by the relevant variable, Π t =P t /P t-1 , and, for compactness of notation, the function pw' is used to denote the partial derivative of P(M t /P t-1 )w(M t /P t-1 ) with respect to real balances.
The envelope theorem implies that the following holds in the interior of the choice set
The Euler and money demand equations are
where (M t+1 /P t )' and C t+1 ' are next period's real balances and consumption in the event that I am robbed in this period, and the corresponding variables with double-prime marks are those planned in the event of no robbery. Equation 11 can be found by combining (8) and (10), and (12) can be derived from (9) and (10).
The Euler equation (11) is standard in problems of this type. Condition (12) shows that the consumer chooses monetary balances by weighing the following marginal benefits and costs of holding an additional unit of cash:
(1) the first term is the standard marginal utility benefit due to a reduction in "shoe-leather costs," etc.;
(2) the second term is the joint effect of higher balances on both the probability of being robbed and the severity of the nonpecuniary effects of being robbed; (3) the next term, involving the difference between the values of V in the cases of robbery and no robbery, shows the marginal impact of a higher probability of being robbed on the expected stocks of assets, A t+1 and trauma, R t+1 and hence on future utility (note that this term is negative because the value function is strictly increasing in assets and strictly decreasing in the stock of trauma); and (4) the last two terms represent the marginal utility costs due to foregone consumption in period t+1 (at a given probability of robbery). First, in the case of robbery with probability P, the consumer loses the gross return (1+r) that he or she would have earned by storing a marginal unit of wealth in bonds; second, if no robbery occurs, an event with probability (1-P), the consumer still loses the gross bond return, but retains the money, which is scaled down by inflation to obtain new real balances.
Hence, there are four reasons in this model why the possibility of being robbed reduces the net marginal benefits of holding real balances. First, any case of robbery reduces psychological and/or physical well-being. This is due to (a) the impact on current-period utility, through the function w and (b) the impact on future utility, through the function g. The expected value of both of these costs is increased when more money is held, because the consumer is more likely to be robbed when he or she is holding more real balances and because robbery creates more immediate disutility when more money is lost. Second, the consumer also loses utility when he or she is robbed because of a loss of cash to the robber. This loss (c) has a higher probability and (d) is larger, when more real balances are held.
HOW MUCH DOES CRIME AVOIDANCE EXPLAIN? QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS ROBBERY, PICK-POCKETING, AND PURSE-SNATCHING PROBABILITIES ON MONEY DEMAND
As we saw in the introduction, common sense and the data suggest that people hold very little cash-an average of $100 in 1995 (Porter and Judson 1996) . However, I showed that a simple Baumol-Tobin money demand model, which takes into account the financial and time costs of bank transactions, as well as foregone interest due to cash holdings, indicates that each adult should have held approximately $551.05. Mankiw, in his textbook, clearly indicates that the possibility of robbery, theft, or loss could account for part of the puzzle. He clearly believes that these factors are not sufficient to explain the puzzle. In this section, I add the psychological, physical, and other noncash costs of robbery. The use of an endogenous probability of robbery will increase the impact on money demand of expected cash loss due to robbery and make the noncash impact of robbery relevant for a calculation of money demand.
The modified Baumol-Tobin model uses the following objective function
The consumer's problem is to maximize this function with respect to the variable M, which represents average nominal currency holdings (the price level is normalized to one). The first two terms are identical to the Baumol-Tobin objective function in the introduction. The third term is the expected amount of money lost to criminals, which equals the average amount of money held, M, times the probability P 1 (M) of losing money to robbery, pick-pocketing, or purse-snatching, conditional on the amount of money held. The fourth term is the expected loss above and beyond the amount of cash on hand, which is equal to the conditional probability P 2 (M) of an attempted or completed robbery, times the noncash costs of robbery, s.
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Maximizing (13) with respect to M gives the following money-demand first-order
This equation requires a specification of the conditional probability of loss functions, P 1 and P 2 . I will use the logit functions
where the Greek letters are parameters. 7 These equations give the parameterized demand how the first two terms are parameterized. I parameterize the rest of (14') as follows.
I use two logit equations to solve for λ and θ For P 1 (M'), I use the incidence of completed robbery plus the probability of personal theft (pick-pocketing or purse-snatching) for 1995 from the National Crime Victimization Survey, for a total of .0054 (U.S. Department of Justice 1997). 8 (See Table 2 for 1995 crime rate estimates.)
M" and P 1 (M") are counterfactual data points, so I have no data. I will simply explore the implications of certain plausible figures. So, suppose that increasing money holdings to M" = $1,000 (a tenfold increase) would raise the probability of completed robbery or personal theft to P 1 (M") = .00594, which is a ten-percent increase. This implies an elasticity 9 of theft to money holdings of approximately .0111. Solving equations (17) 10 The use of a monetary cost here is not to make an accounting of the worth of crime reduction to society. In this paper, s is used as a measure of willingness to pay to avoid a crime, without any normative implication that a victim would be fairly compensated by a payment of that amount. Some may feel that the costs of robbery are large but reject the notion that they should adjust their behavior in fear. All of these issues are beyond the scope of a model such as the one in this paper. 11 The term statistical robbery implies a marginal reduction in the probability of robbery. So, as a hypothetical example, a value of $232,000 for a statistical robbery does not imply that subjects would be willing (or able) to pay $232,000 for a police car that would prevent a sure robbery in their communities, but they would be willing to contribute $2.32 toward buying a police car that would reduce the probability of robbery from .0054 to .00539. Cohen et al. (2004, p. 94) actually asked subjects about measures that "successfully prevent[] one in ten armed robberies in your community." 12 Both figures for the nonpecuniary costs of robbery are adjusted to the relevant years using the CPI for all urban consumers. See Appendix 2 for details. Use of the $232,000 figure results in some double-counting, as it presumably includes cash losses, which are accounted for separately in the model. However, the average cash losses incurred in a robbery are obviously only a small fraction of this amount, so doublecounting does not affect estimated money demand very much.
With these parameters in hand, I numerically solved (14'). 13 The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 for a number of different sets of parameters, together with the results reported earlier for the model without robbery and other forms of theft. Table 3 shows estimates based on crime rates from the CVS and Table 4 Table 3 shows cash demands ranging from $312.90 for a relatively low elasticity of crime to cash balances and $231.79 for a higher elasticity, to $125.78 for the highest elasticity considered. 15 Using the higher crime rates reported in the ICVS, one finds a cash demand 13 I used the FindRoot function in Mathematica. 14 The $500 and $1000 figures were arbitrarily chosen "for the sake of argument" to represent very conservative assumptions about the effect of money holdings on crime. Later, an assumption of $200 was added on the grounds that the original assumptions generated excessive money demands. No attempt was made to adjust the parameters to fit the data exactly. 15 Evaluating the logit equations (16 and 17) for crime probabilities at the money demand levels reported below give probabilities that are close to their observed levels. Thus, the conditional expectations in the model are fairly consistent with the behavior generated by the model. The results, shown in Table 5 , are somewhat disappointing, mostly suggesting implausibly large cash demands, even with a high elasticity of crime to money balances. 
CONCLUSION
The models presented in this paper offer what I hope is an intuitively appealing answer to the anomaly that Mankiw pointed out in his textbook. and assumptions that merely seem reasonable, so they should not be taken too seriously as estimates. But they do give a sense of the large costs that might be involved.
This appendix shows how the Bellman equation
can be reformulated so that one can show:
(1) the supreme value function V*, which gives the sup of all expected utilities attainable by following feasible plans, equals the unique function that satisfies the Bellman equation, and any plan generated by the Bellman function attains the supremum given by V*; and (2) all plans that attain the supremum are generated by the Bellman function.
These claims correspond roughly with theorems 9.2 and 9.3 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) , except that here we specialize to finite state space and a bounded value function.
More importantly, our claims involve a Bellman equation with expectations that are conditional on an endogenous choice variable. The purpose of this appendix is to transform the problem so that it uses unconditional expectations, rather than conditional ones, making it clear that the reasoning of Stokey and Lucas's theorems apply. 
Using this form of the Bellman equation, one can prove the first claim at the beginning of this section using the same steps as in theorem 9.2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp. 246-248) . A proof of the second claim follows the same reasoning as theorem 9.3 (pp. 251-253).
APPENDIX 2
Consumption is expenditures on nondurable goods and certain services (transportation, recreation, and "other") 
TABLES

